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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article provides an update of certain significant developments
in the area of intellectual property law during the Survey period.'
The article considers only those decisions that are precedential in
Texas. Thus, the cases cited will be limited to decisions of the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For develop-
ments in trademark and copyright law, the Fifth Circuit's authority is
binding. However, because all cases concerning a substantive issue of
patent law are appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit decisions from the Federal Circuit during the Survey pe-
* B.S., Trinity University, 1986; J.D. Baylor University, 1989. Partner, Intellectual
Property Litigation Practice Group, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Texas, 1999; J.D. University of Houston Law Center, summa
cum laude, 2003.
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors, and not
those of Haynes and Boone, LLP or any of its clients.
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riod are also included in this article. 2
Of particular interest to the patent practitioner during this Survey pe-
riod are two Federal Circuit opinions that could significantly impact pat-
ent litigation in the future-one invites amicus briefing on the most
fundamental principles of the court's claim construction jurisprudence,
and the other considers the evidentiary impact of an alleged patent in-
fringer's failure to obtain or produce a non-infringement opinion. This
article will also consider significant developments in the areas of copy-
right and trademark infringement from the Fifth Circuit.
II. PATENT UPDATE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-an appel-
late court created by Congress to promote uniformity in patent law-
issued 125 opinions in patent cases during the Survey period. 3 The ap-
peals that it hears most often come from United States District courts
from every United States jurisdiction. Each of its opinions, however, are
binding authority for patent cases tried in any of the federal districts in
Texas. The Federal Circuit made significant additions and refinements to
its precedent during the Survey period. These changes came in the areas
of claim construction; the doctrine of equivalents; validity under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103; the enablement, written description, and best
mode requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112; inequitable conduct; and in the
evidentiary presumptions associated with an alleged infringer's decision
whether to waive the attorney-client privilege by producing a non-in-
fringement opinion by patent counsel. The court's opinions in each of
these areas will be discussed in turn.
A. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
DURING THE SURVEY PERIOD: PHILLIPS AND KNORR
1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.4
By far the most significant development in the area of patent litigation
during the Survey period-and perhaps the past decade-occurred in the
area of claim construction. Claim construction is the process by which
the district court judge construes the meanings of the terms of the patent
claims that are in dispute. Since the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. in 1996, in which the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that claim
construction is a matter of law for the district judge, the Federal Circuit
has established a number of fundamental principles of claim construction
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto
Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
3. Although the Federal Circuit also hears veterans appeals, international tax ap-
peals, and various other appeals in specialized areas, a list of the Federal Circuit's patent
opinions from the Survey period can be obtained from BNA's Intellectual Property Li-
brary, available at www.bna.com.
4. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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for the district court to follow. 5 Nevertheless, since more than half of
district courts that hear patent cases are reversed on claim construction,
there is a great deal of uncertainty and risk in patent litigation.6 Accord-
ingly, on July 21, 2004, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc rehearing
order in Phillips v. AWH Corp., in which it requested briefing from the
parties and from certain amici regarding fundamental issues of claim
construction. 7
In its rehearing order, the Federal Circuit requested briefing and
agreed to hear oral argument on the following seven questions:
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries
and similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily
to the patentee's use of the term in the specification? If both sources
are to be consulted, in what order?
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim inter-
pretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim lan-
guage (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has
acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a
clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language in the specifica-
tion will satisfy those conditions? What use should be made of gen-
eral as opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of
ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of
the same term? If the dictionary provides multiple potentially appli-
cable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specifica-
tion to determine what definition or definitions should apply?
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specifi-
cation, what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of
the ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of
the invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a
single embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth
are disclosed?
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the
majority and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alterna-
tive, conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be treated as
complementary methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on
claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies
in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for
the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103 and 112?
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one
of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the
disputed claim terms?
5. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
6. Allison C. Collard & Edward J. Callaghan, Federal Circuit to Clarify Rules on Use
of Dictionaries in Construing Patent Claims, available at http://www.collardroe.comArti-
clel.htm (last modified May 14, 2004).
7. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1382-83.
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7. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.... and our en banc decision in Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.. . ., is it appropriate for this court to
accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction
rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what
extent?
8
In light of the breadth of fundamental claim construction tenets on
which the Federal Circuit will hear argument, it is clear that Phillips is
potentially the single most important Federal Circuit reconsideration of a
fundamental set of questions of patent law since its ruling in Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., which re-considered the manner in
which the doctrine of equivalents would be applied to individual elements
of patent claims. 9 The Federal Circuit received briefs in Phillips on Sep-
tember 20, 2004, and heard oral arguments on February 8, 2005. Because
a decision cannot be expected in this case until at least the second half of
2005, there will be no immediate impact on the conduct of patent trials.
What impact Phillips will have on the court's appellate review of those
trials, however, is an open question at this point.
2. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp.10
The Federal Circuit's other landmark decision during the Survey pe-
riod came in the area of willful infringement. Specifically, the court con-
sidered the evidentiary impact of an accused infringer's failure to obtain a
non-infringement opinion, or of refusing to waive the attorney-client
privilege with respect to an opinion that it obtained.
The much-anticipated en banc opinion in Knorr-Bremse is bound to
have a substantial impact on the conduct of patent litigation in the future,
as it overrules the Federal Circuit's long-standing precedent with respect
to the evidentiary presumption that corresponds to a patent infringement
defendant's failure to obtain or to enter into evidence a non-infringement
opinion of patent counsel.11 Specifically, the court held that no adverse
inference may be drawn with regard to willful infringement when the de-
fendant: (1) invokes the attorney-client privilege or work-product doc-
trine to withhold an opinion of counsel regarding infringement; or
(2) states that no legal advice was obtained.12 Rather, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that willful infringement is to be determined based on a "to-
tality of the circumstances" test, and that the existence of a substantial
8. Id. at 1383 (internal citations omitted).
9. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The authors are not over-looking the significant impact of Festo IX and its progeny, which
altered the face of the doctrine of equivalents and its application by setting forth a pre-
sumption of prosecution history estoppel, and detailing a three-pronged test for avoiding
what has since been labeled "the Festo presumption." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
10. 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1344-45.
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defense on the merits to infringement, while not automatically sufficient
to defeat an allegation of willful infringement, is to be considered among
the other factors and circumstances. 13
Since the Federal Circuit has prohibited the drawing of an adverse in-
ference, those accused of patent infringement will now have a meaningful
choice as to whether to produce an opinion of patent counsel that was
obtained prior to the initiation of suit, or whether to maintain the opinion
as privileged. What remains to be seen, however, is whether the adverse
inference, now disallowed from an evidentiary standpoint, will neverthe-
less be applied by judges and jurors as a matter of common sense or
cynicism.
B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
While the Federal Circuit's rehearing order in Phillips, (discussed
above) may alter the face of the Federal Circuit's claim construction juris-
prudence, the court refined its claim construction precedent in several
other notable opinions during the Survey period. In Goldenberg v.
Cytogen, Inc.,14 the Federal Circuit held that patents having a familial
relationship may be included as intrinsic evidence for claim construction
purposes. 15 The court cautioned, however, that the intrinsic evidence
does not include the contents and prosecution history of patent applica-
tions having no formal relationship to the patent in question.' 6 Milton
Goldenberg and Immunomedics sued Cytogen, Inc. and C.R. Bard for
infringement of a patent claiming methods for locating tumor cells. The
patent-in-suit was the result of a continuation application. During prose-
cution of the parent of the patent-in-suit, the applicant overcame a
double-patenting rejection based on an unrelated application by making
an argument related to the "intracellular tumor associated antigens"
claimed in the patent-in-suit, and distinguishing those from the "cell sur-
face" antigens claimed in the unrelated application. Immunomedics sub-
sequently filed a continuation-in-part application from that unrelated
application. 17
In construing the claims of the patent-in-suit, the district court treated
the unrelated application and its continuation-in-part application as part
of the intrinsic record of the patent-in-suit.' 8 The district court granted
summary judgment of no literal infringement. 19 Although the Federal
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, it found that the district
court's errors in considering the contents and prosecution history of the
unrelated application and its continuation-in-part application during con-
13. Id. at 1347.
14. 373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 1164-66.
16. Id. at 1167-68.





struction of patent-in-suit's claims was harmless error.20 Thus, although
they were in fact part of the intrinsic record of the patent-in-suit because
of the distinguishing argument made by the applicant during prosecution
of the patent-in-suit, the lack of a formal relationship between the patent-
in-suit and the unrelated application and its continuation-in-part applica-
tion ("CIP") made the district court's reliance on the contents and prose-
cution history of the latter during claim construction erroneous.21 The
Federal Circuit summarized the district court's error as follows:
The district court made no error to the extent that it referenced the
contents of the '262 application as it existed when Goldenberg distin-
guished the '262 application from the '261 application .... This re-
sponse constitutes part of the prosecution history of the '261
application, which is a parent application to the [patent-in-suit], and
therefore part of the [patent-in-suit's] prosecution history . . . . The
district court did err in the second segment of its analysis, however,
when it relied on the specification of the '744 patent to construe the
claims. The relevant passages from the '744 patent ... were added
during continuation-in-part of the '262 application. These passages
are therefore new matter added to the content of the '262 application
subsequent to when it was distinguished [during prosecution of the
patent-in-suit.]"22
The court summarized its holding by cautioning that:
in the absence of an incorporation into the intrinsic evidence, this
court's precedent takes a narrow view of when a related patent or its
prosecution history is available to construe the claims of a patent at
issue and draws a distinct line between patents that have a familial
relationship and those that do not.23
In Intirtool Ltd. v. Texar Corp., the Federal Circuit refined its prece-
dent with respect to the effect of the language of a claim preamble during
claim construction. 24 The court held that where there is no clear reliance
during prosecution on a claim preamble to distinguish the claimed inven-
tion from the prior art, and where the invention is described in complete
structural detail in the body of the claim, the claim preamble is not limit-
ing.25 Intirtool argued that the district court's invalidity finding was
based on an incorrect understanding of "the claimed invention. '2 6 Spe-
20. Id. at 1168.
21. Id. at 1167. It is important to note that the Federal Circuit afforded the CIP and
the new application the same treatment in this case, at least for purposes of its claim con-
struction analysis, only because the court relied on the fact that both the new application
and the CIP contained new matter. A continuation application would have been based on
the same specification as the patent-in-suit and would have been treated differently than a
new application because the former has a formal, familial relationship with the patent-in-
suit; it is the introduction of new matter into the specification of the CIP in this case that
drove the Federal Circuit's analysis.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Intirtool Ltd. v. Texas Corp., 369 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
25. Id. at 1295.
26. Id. at 1294.
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cifically, Intirtool maintained that the district court erred in construing
the preamble of claim one of the patent-in-suit as a claim limitation.
27
The preamble read "[a] hand-held punch pliers for simultaneously punch-
ing and connecting overlapping sheet metal such as at the corners of
overlapping ceiling tile grids."'28 The term "connecting" appeared only in
the claim preamble, and Intirtool argued that it was included only to
demonstrate an intended purpose of the tool.29 Texar, on the other hand,
pointed to references in the specification and the prosecution history
where the words "connecting" and "connects" were used to describe the
invention, arguing that the preamble should be limiting because Intirtool
clearly relied on it during prosecution to distinguish the claimed inven-
tion from the prior art.3
0
The Federal Circuit disagreed, reciting its general precedent to the ef-
fect that "in general, a claim preamble is limiting if 'it recites essential
structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give 'life, meaning, and vitality'
to the claim."'31 "However, if the body of the claim 'describes a structur-
ally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does
not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,' the preamble is
generally not limiting 'unless there is clear reliance on the preamble dur-
ing prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior
art." 32 Finding in the case at bar that the claimed tool was described in
claim one in complete and exacting structural detail "including precise
parameters of the cut that the face of the tool makes in sheet metal," and
further noting that the preamble of claim one did not recite any addi-
tional structure or steps underscored as important by the specification,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court committed reversible error
by using the claim preamble to limit claim one.
33
In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. the Federal Circuit considered
the situation where the written description is narrow, while the claim lan-
guage is broad.34 The court found that, although every embodiment de-
scribed in the specification of the patent-in-suit included a particular
limitation, the limitations should not be imported into the claims unless
the patentee demonstrated a clear intention to limit the scope of the
claim.35 Liebel-Flarsheim Company sued Medrad, Inc. based on
Medrad's alleged infringement of four U.S. patents relating to powered




30. Id. at 1295.
31. Id. (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
32. Id. (quoting Catalina Mktg., Int'l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
33. Id. at 1296.
34. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 903.
36. Id. at 900.
2005]
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In construing the claims of the four patents, the district court imported
limitations from the specifications of each patent.37 Because the devices
in question did not contain the imported limitations, the district court
granted Medrad's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. 38
The Federal Circuit held that, although every embodiment described in
the patents included the limitation of pressure jackets around syringes
used in the powered injectors, the specifications did not describe the in-
ventions as limited to those embodiments. 39 Moreover, the prosecution
histories of two patents squarely contradicted the notion that the paten-
tee claimed only those powered injectors that included pressure jackets
around the syringes.40 Thus, the court rejected Medrad's contention that
"when the subject matter claimed in the patent-in-suit is the only subject
matter described ... that subject matter is the invention, and not simply a
'preferred embodiment' of a broader invention." 4 1 To the contrary, the
Federal Circuit made clear that "even when the specification describes
only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read re-
strictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit
the claim scope using 'words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
restriction.' ",42
The Federal Circuit clarified its precedent with respect to the role of a
patent's specification in claim construction in Combined Sys. Inc. v. De-
fense Tech. Corp. of America; the court cautioned that the district court in
that case "may have read some isolated statements in certain recent opin-
ions too rigidly and in isolation from our entire body of our claim con-
struction jurisprudence. '43 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's claim construction because it found that all the intrinsic evidence
was consistent with that construction, and the court emphasized that its
cases do not allow a district court to consult a patent's specification
"solely for the limited purpose of determining whether it contradicts the
dictionary meaning of a claim term."'44 Rather, "the written description
must be examined in every case, because it is relevant not only to aid in
the claim construction analysis, but also to determine if the presumption
of ordinary and customary meaning is rebutted. '45
Finally, in Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., the Federal Circuit held
that when claim construction rulings are issued prior to trial, the district
court is required to instruct the jury on the court's claim construction
37. Id. at 901.
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 909.
41. Id. at 905-06.
42. Id. (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
43. Combined Sys., Inc. v. Def. Tech. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 1207, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
44. Id. at 1215-16.
45. Id. at 1216 (quoting Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d
1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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rulings as to all disputed claim terms and instruct the jury to adopt and
apply the court's construction of those disputed terms during its delibera-
tions.46 Sulzer Textil filed suit against its competitor weaving machine
manufacturer Picanol N.V. for infringement of two of its patents on air-
jet weaving technology, and Sulzer Textile moved for a new trial on the
basis that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on its claim
construction, which it adopted from a Special Master's recommenda-
tions.47 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a new
trial because the instructions, through erroneous, were not prejudicial be-
cause the parties had followed the court's claim construction throughout
trial.48 Nevertheless, the court emphasized that:
the meaning and scope of patent claim terms, as determined by a
district court's claim construction rulings, are legal issues central to
most patent cases. Thus, the district court normally will need to pro-
vide the jury in a patent case with instructions adequate to ensure
that the jury fully understands the court's claim construction rulings
and what the patentee covered by the claims.49
C. OBVIOUSNESS/ANTICIPATION/ON-SALE AND PUBLIC USE BARS
In addition to claim construction, the Federal Circuit was active in the
area of patent validity during the Survey period, particularly on the issues
of anticipation and the on-sale and public use bars of 35 U.S.C. § 102, and
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Applying the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the Federal Circuit held
in Elan Corp. PLC v. Andrx Pharms., Inc. that the "offers for sale" of the
claimed invention were not invalidating offers by the plaintiff to sell its
patented invention more than one year prior to filing its patent applica-
tion, but rather were simply offers to enter into a license agreement
under the patent if and when it was developed, thus establishing that such
negotiations by the patentee prior to applying for a patent on his inven-
tion will not create an on-sale bar to issuance of the patent.50 Elan, the
owner of a patent directed to a controlled-release formulation of
naproxen sodium, an anti-inflammatory drug, wrote letters to various lab-
oratories offering to license rights to what would later become the patent-
in-suit. When Elan sued Andrx Pharmaceuticals in 1998 because Andrx
sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration to market its
own once-daily naproxen formulation, Andrx asserted the on-sale bar as
a defense, based on the letters that Elan had sent in 1987-four years
before applying for the patent-in-suit in 1991.5 1
46. Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 1360-62.
48. Id. at 1367.
49. Id. at 1366.
50. Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
51. Id. at 1338-39.
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Although the district court agreed with Andrx's assertion of the on-sale
bar, the Federal Circuit reversed because for the on-sale bar to apply, the
product must (1) be the subject of a commercial offer for sale, and (2) be
ready for patenting.52 The court's holding that a license, which is nothing
more than a sale of rights in the patent, is distinct from a sale of the
invention itself was critical to the reversal. Because Elan offered nothing
more than a license in its letters to the various laboratories, it had not
offered to sell the patented invention, and therefore, the on-sale bar of
§ 102(b) was not implicated. 53
The Federal Circuit considered another bar to patentability contained
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)-the public use bar-in Smithkline Beecham Corp.
v. Apotex Corp.54 Smithkline sued Apotex for infringement of its patent
directed to the active ingredient of the drug Paxil; the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of validity and held that the paten-
tee's clinical trials of the drug were not directed to the claimed features of
the compound and, therefore, were not an experimental use under
§ 102(b). 55 "The court clarified that the experimental use doctrine is not
an 'exception' to the public use bar because it does not shift the burden of
proof from the accused infringer to the patentee. Rather it operates to
negate application of the public use bar."'56 In other words, the ultimate
burden of showing that the non-experimental use was public remains on
the patent challenger. 57
With these standards and burdens in mind, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that Apotex had sustained its burden of demonstrating applicabil-
ity of the public use bar because SmithKline was testing the claimed as an
antidepressant, yet the antidepressant properties of the compound were
not part of the claimed invention.58 "Testing or experimentation per-
formed with respect to non-claimed features of the device does not show
that the invention was the subject of experimentation. '59 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit found Smithkline's patent invalid by operation of the
public use bar.60
On the issue of anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Federal Circuit
held in Elan Pharms. v. Mayo Found. that in order for a prior art refer-
ence to serve as an anticipating reference, it must teach one of ordinary
skill in the art to make or carry out the claimed invention without undue
52. Id. at 1340.
53. Id. at 1341. For example, one of the letters that Elan sent to a pharmaceutical
laboratory stated, "with regard to naproxen, I would like to confirm to you our licensing
and development plans for our once daily tablet aimed at a launch in the U.S.A. by the
patent expiry date." Id. at 1337.
54. 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1320.
56. Id. at 1317.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1318.
59. Id. (quoting W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
60. Id. at 1320.
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experimentation. 61 The district court granted summary judgment of pat-
ent invalidity based on anticipation, but the Federal Circuit reversed, and
found that the district court did not address the issue of whether the al-
legedly anticipating reference was sufficiently enabling to permit one of
ordinary skill in the art to make the claimed invention without undue
experimentation. 62 With respect to the amount of required experimenta-
tion that would render an anticipatory reference non-enabling, the court
stated that "the test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable
amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the
specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with
respect to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed. '63
The Federal Circuit considered Elan's argument that the alleged anticipa-
tory reference did not enable the transgenic animal it described because,
although that reference "foresaw a transgenic mouse and presented a
compilation of known methods of gene transfer, the reference does not
teach or suggest which method might succeed in creating the desired mu-
tated mouse." 64 The court remanded to allow the district court to deter-
mine whether the allegedly anticipating reference enabled persons of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make the desired mutated
mouse without undue experimentation. 65
Finally, with respect to obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Federal
Circuit held in Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. that evidence
which is developed after a patent has issued may be used to support the
validity of the patent, and evidence which comes to light subsequent to
the issuance of a patent which supports a holding of nonobviousness
should be considered because there is no requirement that an invention's
properties and advantages be fully known before the patent application is
filed.66 The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding that all
the claims of the patent-in-suit were obvious in light of the prior art. The
court also held that the district court's refusal to consider evidence
presented by the patentee to show unexpected results was error because
the "unexpected benefits or results were discovered after the [patent-in-
suit] had been issued."' 67 The Federal Circuit made clear that "evidence
developed after the patent grant is not excluded from consideration, for
understanding of the full range of an invention is not always achieved at
the time of filing the patent application. '68 The court went on to explain
that it is also not improper to conduct additional experiments and provide
later-obtained data in support of patent validity. 69
61. Elan Pharms. v. Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1055
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
62. Id. at 1057.
63. Id. at 1055 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
64. Id. at 1056.
65. Id.
66. Knoll Pham. Co. v. Tera Pharms. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004).





D. ENABLEMENT/WRITTEN DESCRIPTION/BEST MODE
35 U.S.C. § 112 sets forth three requirements that a patent's specifica-
tion must meet: the disclosure of the invention must be enabling; the writ-
ten description of the invention must be sufficient; and the specification
must describe the best mode of practicing the invention, if the inventor is
aware of one.70 The Federal Circuit dealt with each of these areas during
the Survey period.
The Federal Circuit considered § 112's enablement requirement in
CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp. and vacated the district court's finding
that the invention claimed in the patent-in-suit was not enabled by the
patent's specification.71 The patents at issue in the suit claimed a system
for cleaning semiconductor wafers. The district court found that they
were not enabled because their commercial embodiments did not meet
commercial standards for cleanliness in the industry, noting that "the first
wafers processed with the Full Flow system appeared clean to the naked
eye" but looked "filthy" when viewed using laser scanning.72 The Federal
Circuit held that the district court misapplied § 112's enablement require-
ment by requiring that the patent disclosures enable a single embodi-
ment-the Full Flow system-to meet the industry standards.73
In essence, the district court set the enablement bar too high. En-
ablement does not require an inventor to meet lofty standards for
success in the commercial marketplace. Title 35 does not require
that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to
make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a
claim limitation to that effect.74
Applying the correct standard, the Federal Circuit determined that the
various limitations of the patent-in-suit were enabled.
75
In In re Wallach, the Federal Circuit upheld the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences' rejection of claims on the ground that the written
description was inadequate under 35 U.S.C. § 112.76 The Federal Circuit
held that, with respect to DNA sequences derived from known partial
protein sequences, the written description that described only the partial
sequence was insufficient, even though the patent only claimed those
DNA sequences within the specific genus that can encode the partial
amino acid sequence. 77 The sequence of the full DNA molecule could
not be determined from the partial amino acid sequence described.78
This did not satisfy the Federal Circuit's holding that the written descrip-
tion requirement is met by "showing that an invention is complete by
70. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
71. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 1337.
73. Id. at 1338.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1339.
76. In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2004).




disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics...
i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical proper-
ties, functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed
correlation between function and structure, or some combination of such
characteristics. ' '79 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that a description of a
partial protein sequence does not give disclosure sufficient to evidence
possession of the claimed invention.8 0
In High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., the
Federal Circuit held that a patent may be held invalid for failure to dis-
close the best mode if: (1) the inventor knew about a better mode than
was disclosed; and (2) the inventor intentionally concealed the better
mode.81 High Concrete is the owner of a patent directed to a tilt frame
used to support heavy cargo, such as concrete structures on a transport
truck. When it sued New Enterprise Stone and Lime Company for in-
fringement of its patent, New Enterprise asserted a counterclaim of inva-
lidity based in part on its argument that High Concrete knew of a better
mode than that disclosed in the patent's specification. Although both
parties agreed that the use of a crane for heavy loads was well known
among people of skill in the industry, without evidence of concealment,
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding of invalidity for
failure to disclose the best mode because "known ways of performing a
known operation cannot be deemed intentionally concealed absent evi-
dence of intent to deliberately withhold that information. ' '82
E. DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS/CLAIM SCOPE
The Federal Circuit's landmark decision in Festo IX, dealt with the ap-
plication of the prosecution history estoppel to narrow the range of
equivalents to which the patentee is entitled under the doctrine of
equivalents. Although this case was decided just prior to the Survey pe-
riod its impact was reflected in several of the court's opinions during the
Survey period.83
In its en banc decision in Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand
Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a presumption of prosecution history
estoppel applies to a limitation originally found in a dependent claim
when that claim is re-written into independent form and the limitation is
not found in the original independent claim to which the dependent claim
referred, and where the base independent claim is cancelled for reasons
related to patentability.84 The court stated that this conclusion is re-
79. Id. (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)).
80. Id. at 1334.
81. High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 377 F.3d 1379,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
82. Id. at 1384.
83. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Festo IX].




quired because the additional limitation effectively narrows the scope of
the claimed subject matter and presents a narrowing amendment made
for reasons related to patentability. 8
5
Honeywell sued Hamilton Sundstrand, asserting only the doctrine of
equivalents as a theory of infringement of Honeywell's patent for an air-
craft auxiliary power unit (a small gas turbine engine usually located in
the tail section of an airplane). Honeywell conceded that the inlet guide
vane limitation contained in its patent was not literally met by the ac-
cused device, but alleged that the inlet guide vane position performed an
equivalent function in the accused device. The Federal Circuit framed
the issue as "whether a narrowing amendment to a patent claim that adds
an additional claim limitation creates a presumptive surrender of
equivalents under the Supreme Court's decisions in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co."'86
The Federal Circuit's recent Festo IX decision made clear that the pre-
sumption of surrender of claim scope may be rebutted if the patentee can
demonstrate that: (1) "the alleged equivalent would have been unforesee-
able at the time.., the narrowing amendment" was made; (2) "the ratio-
nale underlying the narrowing amendment bore no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent; and (3) there was some other reason
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably have been expected to
have described the alleged equivalent. ' 87 In light of that authority, the
Federal Circuit's task in Honeywell was to determine whether "rewriting
a dependent claim into independent form, coupled with the cancellation
of the original independent claim, constitutes a narrowing amendment
when the dependent claim includes an additional claim limitation not
found in the cancelled independent claim or circumscribes a limitation
found in the cancelled independent claim."'88 The court determined that
it did, holding that:
the fact that the scope of the rewritten claim has remained un-
changed will not preclude the application of prosecution history es-
toppel if, by canceling the original independent claim and rewriting
the dependent claims into independent form, the scope of subject
matter claimed in the independent claim has been narrowed to se-
cure the patent.89
Likewise, in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharms., Inc., the Fed-
eral Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Festo neither ex-
cuses an applicant from claiming readily known equivalents at the time of
application nor allows a patentee to rebut the presumption of disavowal
85. Id. at 1139-40.
86. Id. at 1139; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushi Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) [hereinafter
Festo VIIIJ.
87. Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1368.
88. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1141.
89. Id. at 1142.
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of claim scope by invoking its own failure to include a known equivalent
in its original application. 90 The district court determined on summary
judgment that Smithkline's patent, which claimed a controlled-release
formulation of a chemical compound known as "HPMC," was not in-
fringed by Excel Pharmaceutical's generic substitute drugs. The Federal
Circuit determined on appeal that Smithkline's narrowing amendments
during prosecution invoked the Festo presumption of prosecution history
estoppel. The Federal Circuit further rejected Smithkline's argument that
the polyvinylalcohol used in Excel's drug in place of HPMC was not a
foreseeable equivalent, and that it could not have added the polyviny-
lalcohol to its claims at the time of amendment without drawing a new
matter rejection. This is because Smithkline misconstrued Festo, which
applies only at the time of amendment, whereas Smithkline should have
foreseen and included the polyvinylalcohol equivalent at the time of filing
of its patent application.91
The Supreme Court [in Festo] ties foreseeability to whether the ap-
plicant would have been expected to know of, and thus properly
claim, the proposed equivalent at the time of amendment. The Su-
preme Court's passage addresses the time of amendment only and
does not address the instance where the applicant could not properly
claim a known equivalent because it had purposely left that known
substitute out of its disclosure at the time of filing. In such an in-
stance, the applicant should have foreseen and included the pro-
posed equivalent in its claims at the time of filing.92
F. PRE-SUIT INVESTIGATION
On the issue of what constitutes a sufficient investigation by a patent-
holder prior to filing a claim of patent infringement for Rule 11 pur-
poses,93 the Federal Circuit held in Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co.
that a key factor in determining whether a patentee performed a reasona-
ble inquiry prior to asserting a patent-infringement claim is whether the
patentee conducted a claim interpretation and infringement analysis. 94
Q-Pharma owned a patent directed to a method for therapeutically treat-
ing damaged tissue by topically administering a composition containing
Coenzyme Q10; Q-Pharma sued Andrew Jergens for infringement in the
sale of its Cur6l CoQ10 lotion. Jergens filed a motion for summary judg-
ment of non-infringement, in which it revealed that the accused product
contained no more than 0.00005% CoQ10 by weight. Jergens also moved
for sanctions against Q-Pharma under Rule 11, which was denied when
the district court determined that Q-Pharma had made a sufficient pre-
filing inquiry to determine whether the accused product infringed. Al-




93. Referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
94. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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though Q-Pharma did not conduct a chemical analysis of the product, its
attorneys performed a claim construction analysis and relied on Jergens'
advertising statements regarding the content of its lotion.95 Therefore,
the pre-filing inquiry was sufficient.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that "in the context of patent
infringement actions, we have interpreted Rule 11 to require, at a mini-
mum, that an attorney interpret the asserted patent claims and compare
the accused device with those claims before filing a claim alleging in-
fringement. '96 The court held that Q-Pharma's construction of the pat-
ent's claim as requiring no minimum amount of CoQ10 was reasonable in
light of the intrinsic record, because "Q-Pharma's claim interpretation,
while broad, followed the standard canons of claim construction and was
reasonably supported by the intrinsic record. '97 Because any amount of
CoQ10 would have satisfied the claims of the patent as interpreted by Q-
Pharma's attorneys no chemical analysis was necessary and Q-Pharma's
pre-suit investigation satisfied the requirements of Rule 11.98
G. DAMAGES
The Federal Circuit held in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. that
where a functional relationship exists between a patented device and an
unpatented accessory or component, the patentee is entitled to present
evidence of damages from lost sales of the unpatented component.99
Juicy Whip is the patentee of a beverage dispenser that simulates the ap-
pearance of the dispensed beverage to promote sales; a transparent bowl
containing the post-mix solution creates the visual that the bowl is the
primary source of the dispensed beverage. On remand, the district court
denied Juicy Whip's motion to introduce testimony on its lost profits on
syrup sales based on its argument that it would have sold more syrup but
for Orange Bang's infringement. The district court's denial was based on
its finding that Juicy Whip failed to establish that the syrup and the pat-
ented dispenser constituted a single functional unit. The Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the district court because "the court was clearly
erroneous in determining that there was no functional relationship be-
tween Juice Whip's dispenser and the syrup; on the contrary, it is clear
that there is such a relationship and Juicy Whip should be entitled to
prove damages with respect to lost profits from lost syrup sales."'100
III. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought
under the Copyright Act, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provides
95. Id. at 1297-99.
96. Id. at 1300-01.
97. Id. at 1301.
98. Id.
99. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
100. Id. at 1371.
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binding precedent for the Texas practitioner of copyright law. The court
issued relatively few copyright opinions during the Survey period. Of
particular importance, however, is one opinion that refined the court's
jurisprudence in an area of increasing importance to intellectual property
in the twenty first century-infringement of copyrights in computer
source code.
General Universal Systems Inc. v. Lee involved a claim by General Uni-
versal Systems ("GUS") alleging that a partnership known as HAL cop-
ied the non-literal elements of a software system that GUS had
developed for a client.10 1 After some discovery, GUS also claimed that
HAL infringed its copyright in the literal source code, as evidenced by
the fact that the two programs were substantially similar. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on both grounds, and
GUS appealed.10 2
On appeal, GUS asserted two points of error. First, GUS claimed that
the district court erred in applying the abstraction-filtration analysis
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Altai to its claims for infringement of the
source code, which GUS contended should only be applied to determine
whether non-literal elements of software contain any copyrightable ex-
pression. Second, GUS claimed that the court applied too restrictive an
analysis in determining whether the source code had been copied. With
respect to the first ground, the court acknowledged that "although we
have generally endorsed the Altai test to evaluate claims that nonliteral
software elements were copied, we have not explicitly addressed whether
that test should be used to evaluate charges that a program's source code
or object code was copied."'1 03 The court did not resolve the issue, how-
ever, because it found that the district court dismissed only GUS's claims
relating to the non-literal elements of the software based on its abstrac-
tion-filtration analysis. 104
Regarding GUS's second point of error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of GUS's claim that HAL copied the literal
source code, based on a lack of evidence of substantial similarity. 105
While GUS argued that the district court required that the infringed pro-
gram be "virtually identical" rather than substantially similar to the copy-
righted program, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court
properly applied the standard of substantial similarity. GUS failed to ad-
duce sufficient evidence of similarity in response to HAL's motion for
summary judgment by failing to attach a copy of its source code so that a
side-by-side comparison could be performed.10 6 Rather, the evidence
that GUS attached included: (1) a printout containing names of fields
used by the program, purporting to be a "database layout;" (2) a direc-
101. Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004).
102. Id. at 137-39.
103. Id. at 143.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 145.
106. Id. at 146.
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tory list giving the names of data entry fields used by the two software
systems; (3) a print-out of a program contained within the larger copy-
righted software program; and (4) print-outs of invoices generated by the
program. 10 7 GUS argued that these four pieces were evidence of direct
copying because the layouts of the invoices generated by the copyrighted
and accused programs were nearly identical. The Fifth Circuit, however,
held that this was nothing more than evidence of the non-literal elements
of the programs which were insufficient to satisfy GUS's burden of dem-
onstrating substantial similarity of the source code for the two
programs.' 0 8
General Universal Systems sends a very important message to Texas
copyright practitioners regarding (1) the level of proof required to estab-
lish copying of program source code, even to withstand summary judg-
ment of non-infringement, and (2) regarding the Fifth Circuit's
understanding of the difference between the literal and non-literal ele-
ments of computer software.
IV. TRADEMARK UPDATE
The Fifth Circuit issued several interesting opinions during the Survey
period regarding trademark law. Its relatively few decisions over the past
year provided guidance with respect to the often-litigated "likelihood of
confusion" element of trademark infringement, and the rarely-litigated
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.10 9
In Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that
it was not infringement for a vacuum cleaner retailer to use the plaintiff's
"Kirby" mark in its advertisements for sales of new vacuum cleaners so
long as such advertisements did not suggest affiliation or endorsement by
the plaintiff even though the retailer was not an authorized dealer of
"Kirby" vacuums." 0 The Scott Fetzer Company owns the Kirby Com-
pany, a manufacturer of vacuum cleaners, as well as the "Kirby" trade-
mark and service marks. The defendant, House of Vacuums is a retail
seller of vacuum cleaners in San Antonio. Scott Fetzer alleged that
House of Vacuums' use of the "Kirby" mark in its yellow pages advertise-
ment constituted trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trade-
mark dilution. House of Vacuums was not an authorized Kirby
distributor but repaired a significant number of Kirby vacuums. House of
Vacuums also sold several used models and the occasional new one ob-
tained from an authorized distributor. 111
After considering the advertisement in question, the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that there
was a likelihood of confusion by suggesting that House of Vacuums is
107. Id. at 147.
108. Id.
109. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2004).
110. Scott Fitzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 478 (5th Cir. 2004).
111. Id. at 482-83.
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affiliated with or endorsed by Kirby.112 Central to the court's analysis
was the context in which Kirby's name appeared in the advertisement.
The court observed that "prominent and pervasive use of a mark will
suggest affiliation, but mere reference to a marked product will not. 113
In light of this observation, the court was persuaded by evidence that
there was no likelihood of confusion because (1) the word "Kirby" was
the fifth in a list of thirteen brand names and was not especially promi-
nent; (2) there could be no presumption of bad intent because defendant
was an independent dealer advertising sales or repairs of a branded prod-
uct; (3) intent to compete, which plaintiff adduced, is not tantamount to
intent to confuse, which is one element that supports a finding of likeli-
hood of confusion; and (4) plaintiff could show no evidence of actual
confusion.114
In TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, TrendMaker Homes accused the defendant of
violating the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") by
registering the domain name "www.trendmakerhomes.com." The Fifth
Circuit held that no violation occurred because the defendant lacked a
bad faith intent to profit from the plaintiff's business.11 5 The ACPA pro-
vides that the owner of a mark can recover against a person who, acting
with "a bad faith intent to profit from that mark ... registers, traffics in,
or uses a domain name that ... is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark.1116 The court emphasized that, in other cases where a violation
was found, the defendant "essentially held hostage a domain name that
resembled a mark with the intention of selling it back to the mark's
owner. ' 117 Because Maxwell was merely a disgruntled customer who
posted the website to inform the plaintiff's potential customers about his
bad experience with TrendMaker Homes, the court found no evidence of
bad faith, thus precluding recovery under the Act.118
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id. at 485.
114. Id. at 486.
115. TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).
116. Id. at 436.
117. Id. at 439.
118. Id.
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